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Abstract
Noneism a is form of Meinongianism, proposed by Richard Rout-
ley and developed and improved by Graham Priest in his widely dis-
cussed book Towards Non-Being. Priest’s noneism is based upon the
double move of (a) building a worlds semantics including impossible
worlds, besides possible ones, and (b) admitting a new comprehen-
sion principle for objects, different from the ones proposed in other
kinds of neo-Meinongian theories, such as Parsons’ and Zalta’s. The
new principle has no restrictions on the sets of properties that can
deliver objects, but parameterizes the having of properties by objects
to worlds. Modality is therefore explicitly built in - so the approach
can be conveniently labeled as “modal noneism”. In this paper, I put
modal noneism to work by testing it against classical issues in modal
logic and semantics. It turns out that - perhaps surprisingly - the
theory (1) performs well in problems of transworld identity, which are
frequently considered to be the difficult ones in the literature; (2) faces
a limitation, albeit not a severe one, when one comes to transworld
individuation, which is often taken (especially after Kripke’s notori-
ous ‘stipulation’ solution) as an easy issue, if not a pseudo-problem;
and (3) may stumble upon a real trouble when dealing with what I
shall call ‘extensionally indiscernible entities’ - particular nonexistent
objects modal noneism is committed to.
The road to Nothing is paved with good intensions.
John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations (slightly modified)
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1 Inspecting Modal Noneism
In his classic 1980 book Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond, Richard
Routley (later Sylvan) developed a kind of neo-Meinongian semantics and
ontology he dubbed ‘noneism’. In his Towards Non-Being, the champion of
dialetheism Graham Priest has proposed a couple of interesting developments
for Routley’s theory. Priest’s noneism is based upon a new comprehension
principle for objects, different from the ones proposed in other kinds of neo-
Meinongian theories, such as Parsons [1980] and Zalta [1983]. A key move
in the strategy, following suggestions by Daniel Nolan (Nolan [1998]) and
Nick Griffin (Griffin [1998]), consists in having no restrictions on the (sets
of) properties that can deliver objects, but in parameterizing the having of
properties by objects to (both possible and impossible) worlds. Modality is
therefore explicitly built in such a principle; because of this, the approach
can be conveniently labeled as modal noneism.
Priest claims that “a number of the techniques developed in the book are
relatively novel and untried (and) though I take up what seem to me to be
many of the most important questions and objections, I am sure there are
numerous others, probably even important others, that are not addressed.”
Priest [2005], p. x. This paper aims at showing how modal noneism escapes
some possible (and also actual) objections, and at addressing what I think is
a general problem of the approach.
Specifically, I am interested in checking how, when Meinongian themes
are combined with a non-standard modal framework, the resulting noneist
theory behaves with respect to typical issues in the metaphysics of modal-
ity, such as transworld identity and identification. The canonical entry on
nonexistent objects of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy claims that
modal noneism “raises difficult questions about cross-world identity.” (Re-
icher [2004], 5.1). However, I shall show that - perhaps surprisingly - modal
noneism (1) performs well in problems of transworld identity, that are often
taken to be the hard ones; (2) encounters a limitation, but not a drastic one,
when one comes to transworld individuation, which is usually considered,
especially after Kripke’s influential stance on it, as a pseudo-problem; and
(3) may face a real trouble when dealing with the identity of what I shall
call extensionally indiscernible entities - particular nonexistent objects modal
noneism is committed to. Let us start by introducing the basics of modal
noneism.
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2 From Na¨ıve Meinongianism to Modal Non-
eism
As is well known, Meinongians begin by distinguishing the Sein of objects -
their existential status - from their Sosein, their having - certain - features
or properties (which ones? This is a key issue to be addressed later). And
Meinongians claim that an object can have a set of features even if it doesn’t
exist. This is the so-called ‘Principle of Independence’.
Secondly, this intuition has a beautifully simple formal treatment. Primi-
tive quantifiers, say, Λ and Σ (to be read as ’for all’ and ‘for some’) are taken
as existentially neutral: one can quantify over, and talk in general of, nonex-
istents. Existence is expressed by a perfectly normal first-order predicate -
say, ‘E !’ - employed to provide explicit existential commitment and to define
the existentially loaded quantifiers. ‘All existing things are such that. . . ’ is:
(1) ∀xα(x) =df Λx(E!x→ α(x))
and ‘There exists something such that...’ is:
(2) ∃xα(x) =df Σx(E!x ∧ α(x))
Meinong claimed “There are objects of which it is true that there are no
such objects.” Meinong [1969], p. 490. But this is not a flat contradiction
at all, when one has distinguished the two couples of quantifiers1 - on the
contrary, it is mirrored in everyday talk:
(3) There is something which has been sought by many, namely the site of
Atlantis, but it does not exist. (Wolterstorff [1961])
(4) I thought of something I would like to give you as a Christmas gift, but
I couldn’t buy it for you because it doesn’t exist. (Priest [2005])
In Meinongian logics, contra the Quinean motto, to be (to exist) is not
to be the value of a (bound) variable. (See Parsons [1980], Zalta [1983],
Jacquette [1996].) Na¨ıve Meinongianism endorses what we may call, following
Parsons [1979a], Parsons [1980] and by analogy with na¨ıve set theory, an
Unrestricted Comprehension Principle for objects:
(UCP) For any condition α(x) with free variable x, some object satisfies
α(x).
1In fact, to speak of ‘two couples of quantifiers’, as many do when exposing Meinon-
gianism, is a bit misleading: the existentially loaded couple is explained away by defining
it via the primitive neutral quantifiers and the existence predicate.
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This gives us the schema:
(5) Σxα(x)
for every α(x).2 The intuition is that we specify an object via a given set
of properties, such as is a winged horse, is captured by Bellerophon, climbs
Mount Olympus in search of the Chimera. . . Suppose α(x) is the conjunction
of the relevant predicates. Then, according to the UCP, an object is described
by α(x). If you call the object so described ‘Pegasus’, p, then Pegasus has
the pertinent set of properties: α(p).
The UCP is supposed to hold broadly a priori : it explains how we can
know many things about nonexistent objects: “we know that objects char-
acterized in certain ways have (such and such) properties, precisely because
they are characterized in that way.” (Priest [2005], p. viii). Nonexistent
objects must have the properties they are characterized as having, and this
is why we know what we are talking about when we talk about them - a
priori, broadly speaking, i.e., via a kind of knowledge that doesn’t require
causal connections which are not available with nonexistents.3
Nonetheless, as is well known, the UCP in its na¨ıve form leads to un-
acceptable consequences and is doomed to go down in flames. Two famous
objections by Russell (Russell [1905b], Russell [1905a]) have been taken as a
definitive refutation of Meinongianism tout-court, namely (1) the objection
from inconsistency, and (2) the claim that the UCP allows us to prove the
existence of whatever we want. Let us have a look at them.
Firstly, if one takes into account inconsistent characterizations, the UCP
forces us to admit not only possible objects, but also impossible ones, in the
strict sense of objects that violate the Law of Non-Contradiction. Quine’s
(Quine [1948]) (in)famous example is ‘the round square cupola of Berkeley
College’.4
2Russell’s criticisms of Meinong (Russell [1905b], Russell [1905a]) addressed definite
descriptions, so the UCP might accordingly be reformulated as:
(UCP)Any definite description ιxα(x) designates an object satisfying the description.
This gives us the schema:
(5b) α(ιxα(x))
3As an anonymous referee has pointed out to me, stress on aprioricity may be unappro-
priate when addressing Priest’s variant of Meinongianism, given that Priest has a broadly
Quinean epistemology which might reject an absolute distinction between a priori and a
posteriori. I think that a minimal characterization of aprioricity as knowledge without
causal acquaintance may be acceptable to Priest as well - and this is all I need in the
following.
4A dual difficulty comes from the incompleteness of fictional objects, which seems to
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Secondly, if the UCP held generally for any condition we could run an ‘on-
tological argument’ to prove the existence of anything we like. For instance,
one may consider the following set of properties:
{goldenness, mountainhood, existence}
that is, one may pick the condition α(x) = x is golden and x is a mountain
and x exists. Now existence is a perfectly normal first-order property for
Meinongians, so the UCP would give us a priori an existent golden mountain.
As a result, it seems that we have to restrict the class of conditions α(x)
that may be used to deliver objects; so Meinongians face what we may call
a problem of plenitude for nonexistent objects: find a principle that grants
as many objects as possible, but without the unwelcome consequences of the
na¨ıve theory. Meinongians have been struggling with this, and different kinds
of Meinongianism are delivered by the different basic concepts they introduce
in their restricted or modified comprehension principles. Parsons [1980] and
Jacquette [1996] introduce a subclass of predicates (called assumptible, char-
acterizing or, more often, nuclear - the terminology is due to J.N. Findlay
[1963]), to be used in order to deliver objects.5 The Comprehension Principle
is now restricted to nuclearity:
(NCP) For any condition α(x) on nuclear properties with free variable x,
some object satisfies α(x).
The ‘dual copula’ Meinongian approach by Rapaport [1978], Zalta [1983],
and others, is based upon distinguishing two modes of predication: standard
exemplification and encoding (to stick to Zalta’s terminology). The Dual
Copula Characterization Principle is formulated with respect to encoding:
(DCP) For any condition α(x) with free variable x, some object encodes
α(x).
Now, Priest claims he can do better. The two Russellian problems are
addressed more efficiently by modal noneism via the double move of (1) build-
ing a world semantics which includes (logically) impossible worlds, besides
threaten the Law of Excluded Middle, and/or Bivalence. I will not take into account here
the issue whether incomplete objects are impossible or not, even though endorsement of
De Morgan laws suggests that they might be.
5Here are a few examples, taken from Parsons [1980]; for nuclear predicates: “is blue”,
“is tall”, “kicked Socrates”, “was kicked by Socrates”, “kicked somebody”, “is golden”,
“is a mountain”. . . Extranuclear predicates come in various kinds - Ontological : “exists”,
“is mythical”, “is fictional”. . .Modal : “is possible”, “is impossible”. . . Intentional : “is
thought about by Meinong”, “is worshipped by someone”. . .Technical : “is complete”, “is
consistent”. . . The intuition is that nuclear properties characterize the very nature of the
objects, whereas extranuclear properties somehow supervene on nuclear ones.
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possible ones, and (2) admitting a comprehension principle for objects in
unrestricted, but qualified form.
Impossible worlds, defined as worlds where the laws of logic are different,6
are a well known, albeit controversial, subject of logical and philosophical in-
vestigation. They are nowadays proposed by various authors as a natural
extension of possible worlds theories, having useful applications in the study
of the notions of propositional content, intentional state, belief management,
etc.7 By admitting impossible worlds, we can account for inconsistent ob-
jects, such as Quine’s round square cupola, that is, an object which, given
that if something is a square then that thing is not round, is round and not
round, Rx ∧ ¬Rx. We simply admit inconsistent worlds that realize con-
tradictions. Notice that we do not need to admit true contradictions, or
even possibly true ones, against the LNC (for the non-factive “at world w”
does not allow us to move from something’s being round and not round at
impossible world w to its being round and not round simpliciter): despite
Priest’s being a well known supporter of true contradictions, modal noneism
can retain some neutrality on this issue.
It is move (2) that interests us more. This consists in admitting a(n
unrestricted but) Qualified Comprehension Principle for objects, by param-
eterizing it to worlds: given any condition α(x), some object is described by
it. However, it has its characterizing properties, not necessarily at this world,
but at others - at the worlds that make the characterization true:
(QCP) For any condition α(x) with free variable x, some object satisfies
α(x) at some world. (see Priest [2005], pp. viii and 84)
After all, nonexistent objects are, typically, the target of intentional states
and cognitive representations; and a uniform account of intentionality was
one of the main motivations for Meinong’s introduction of nonexistent ob-
jects. Hence comes Priest’s justification of the move:
Cognitive agents represent the world to themselves in certain
ways. These may not, in fact, be accurate representations of this
6This definition is logic-relative: given some logic L, an impossible world is one in
which the set of truths is not one that holds in any acceptable interpretation of L. A more
restrictive definition claims that impossible worlds are worlds where the set of things that
hold is not the set of things that hold in any classical interpretation. A classical logician
can consider a world where the Law of Excluded Middle fails as a logically impossible
world, since she takes classical logic as the correct logic. A still more specific definition
claims that an impossible world is a world where some contradictions are true, that is,
where sentences of the form α and ¬α hold, against the Law of Non-Contradiction.
7For a general introduction, see e.g. Beall and van Fraassen [2003]. See also Pasniczek
[1998], and the monographic no. 38(1997) of the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic,
entirely devoted to impossible worlds.
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world, but they may, none the less, be accurate representations
of a different world. For example, if I imagine Sherlock Holmes, I
represent the situation much as Victorian London (so, in partic-
ular, for example, there are no aeroplanes); but where there is a
detective that lives in Baker St, and so on. The way I represent
the world to be is not an accurate representation of our world,
but our world could have been like that; there is a world that is
like that. (Priest [2005], p. 84)
To be more precise, there are many such worlds, since representations
are incomplete with respect to many details. Objects picked by a descrip-
tion, therefore, may always satisfy the relevant condition, α(x). According to
Priest, we don’t need to isolate a subset of ‘nuclear’ or characterizing proper-
ties. Also the set {goldenness, mountainhood, existence} works fine now: we
need not assume that an object so characterized, that is, an existent golden
mountain, has its characterizing properties at the actual world. As far as we
know, no golden mountain inhabits the actual world, but golden mountains
are available at the worlds at which the stories we can tell on existent golden
mountains hold.
We can stick to the idea that objects also have properties entailed by
those they are explicitly characterized as having, given some suitable notion
of entailment. In particular, since in Routley’s noneism to exist is to have
causal properties, and/or to be located in space and time, some properties
or relations involving causal features can be taken as existence-entailing in
one or more arguments. The idea can be found in Linsky and Zalta [1994] -
in point of fact, they talk of concreteness-entailing properties, but providing
a rough-and-ready translation from their modal theory to modal noneism is
not too complicated. For instance, if x kisses y, then both x and y must
exist, and if x thinks about y, x must exist although y need not (at least
at possible worlds: more on this in the next paragraph). This accounts for
the intuitive idea that Sherlock Holmes, being a nonexistent object at this
world, cannot actually kiss anyone here, nor can he entertain any thought
here, although he can be thought of (by Doyle, or by any reader of the Doyle
stories). However, if some Doyle novel features Holmes kissing Watson, then
Holmes does kiss Watson at the worlds at which the characterization is true
and, at those worlds (or at least, at the possible ones among them), Holmes
does exist.
Enough for the basics of the theory. Before we come to the substantive
part of this paper, though, I need to introduce some formal machinery that
will later help to state and discuss issues.
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3 Formalities
The following formal semantics comes basically from Priest’s account (Priest
[2005]), but with a few adjustments and, above all, simplifications. Priest
aims at providing a treatment of intentional contexts, taking into account
the typical intentional failures of substitutivity, logical omniscience, etc. His
book also aims at a broad account of the semantics of definite and indefi-
nite descriptions, and of various other subjects. Only a subset of the items
targeted is relevant here, and the formal semantics is simplified accordingly.
So take the usual first-order language with a set of individual constants,
n-place predicates (with a distinguished one-place predicate, E!), individual
variables, the standard connectives ¬,∧,∨,→, the two Meinongian quan-
tifiers, Λ and Σ, box and diamond, 2, 3, and the usual rules for well-
formedness. We also have a sentential operator c© for conceivability: if
α is any well-formed formula, ‘ c©α’ is a well-formed formula, to be read:
‘It is conceived that α’.8 An interpretation of the language is an octuple
< P, I, E,@, D,R,C, v >, where P is the set of possible worlds, and I and
E are two sets of impossible worlds of different kinds. I dub I the set of the
intensionally impossible worlds (in a sense to be explored soon) and E the
set of extensionally impossible worlds (ditto). P , I and E are disjoint and
W = P ∪ I ∪ E is the totality of worlds. @ ∈ P is the distinguished actual
world. This would not be needed if all we wanted from the semantics were
accounts of validity and logical consequence; but @ is to do other, quite im-
portant jobs, as we shall see. D is a non-empty set of objects, R is a ternary
relation on P ∪ I (an optional element of the structure, as we will also see),
and C is a binary relation on the whole set W .
We have constant domain worlds semantics: each world has the same
domain, namely D. This is quite natural for Meinongians. People assume
variable domains in ordinary Kripke semantics to account for the idea that
different things may exist at different worlds. But in a modal noneist frame-
work the unique domain is simply the totality of objects: that some object
o exists at world w1, but not at world w2, is accounted for by having o sat-
isfy the existence predicate E! at w1 and not at w2, and all the epicycles of
8Priest phrases his intentional operator(s) as ‘α is conceived (represented, imagined,
etc.) by cognitive agent a’, therefore endorsing a multi-modal approach; but the agent is
mostly carried around as a parameter and doesn’t do much work - especially, not much
work relevant to the questions addressed here. As an anonymous referee has suggested, it is
worth stressing that ‘conceivability’ is not interpreted throughout this paper as the some-
what technical notion philosophers have started to use when, especially after Chalmers’
works in the philosophy of mind, they have begun to debate on whether conceivability is
a secure guide to metaphysical possibility.
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variable domain modal semantics are left behind: simplex sigillum veri.
Finally, v is the interpretation function assigning denotations to the non-
logical symbols as follows:
• If c is an individual constant, then v(c) ∈ D;
• If P is an n-place predicate and w ∈ W , then v(P,w) is a pair <
v + (P,w), v − (P,w) >, with v + (P,w) ⊆ Dn, v − (P,w) ⊆ Dn.
If P is an n-place predicate, v assigns to it an extension v + (P,w) and an
anti-extension v− (P,w) relative to worlds. Intuitively, the extension of P at
w is the set of n-tuples of which P is true there, and the anti-extension is the
set of n-tuples of which it is false. For possible worlds, we require that the
two be exclusive and exhaustive for any P - let us call this the Classicality
Condition:
(CC) If w ∈ P , then v + (P,w) ∩ v − (P,w) = ∅
v + (P,w) ∪ v − (P,w) = Dn
This reflects the idea that possible worlds must be maximally consistent:
for any predicate P, if w is a possible world, P is either true or false of
the relevant object(s) at w, but not both. Nevertheless, truth and falsity
conditions are spelt separately (in a way familiar from various kinds of non-
bivalent semantics), for things may go differently at impossible worlds.
In order to evaluate quantified sentences we need assignments of denota-
tions to the variables, and a parameterization of the interpretation function,
the usual way: if a is an assignment (a map from the variables to D), then
va is the suitably parameterized interpretation, which goes as follows:
• If c is an individual constant, then va(c) = v(c);
If x is a variable, then va(x) = a(x).
Next, we read “w |=+a α” as “α is true at world w with respect to assignment
a”, and “w |=−a α” as “α is false at world w with respect to assignment a” (I
will sometimes omit the subscript when we are dealing with closed formulas,
for which different assignments, as usual, make no difference). Then we have,
for atomic formulas:
• w |=+a Pt1 . . . tn iff < va(t1), . . . , va(tn) >∈ v + (P,w)
w |=−a Pt1 . . . tn iff < va(t1), . . . , va(tn) >∈ v − (P,w)
For negation:
• w |=+a ¬α iff w |=−a α
w |=−a ¬α iff w |=+a α
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Since extensions and anti-extensions are exclusive and exhaustive at pos-
sible worlds, if w ∈ P we have that w |=+a ¬α iff it is not the case that
w |=+a α; so thanks to the CC at possible worlds negation works “homophon-
ically”, the classical way. And since @ ∈ P , that is, the actual world is a
possible one, there are no truth value gluts or gaps at it: truth simpliciter,
truth at @, behaves in an orthodox way with respect to negation.
Conjunction and disjunction work as follows: for all w ∈ P ∪ I,
• w |=+a α ∧ β iff w |=+a α and w |=+a β
w |=−a α ∧ β iff w |=−a α or w |=−a β
• w |=+a α ∨ β iff w |=+a α or w |=+a β
w |=−a α ∨ β iff w |=−a α and w |=−a β
This means that conjunction and disjunction behave in an orthodox fash-
ion (except, of course, for the fact that they are given truth and falsity
conditions separately) at possible worlds in P , and also at the intensionally
impossible worlds in I. Instead, they behave anarchically at extensionall im-
possible worlds, that is, members of E: here the truth values of conjunctions
and disjunctions are not determined recursively. The interpretation function
v treats them as atomic, assigning extensions and anti-extensions directly, fol-
lowing the idea of (im)possible worlds models introduced by Rantala [1982]
in order to provide a semantics for intentional operators making logical om-
niscience fail. So at points in E the truth values of conjunctions and dis-
junctions are not assigned recursively, but directly determined by v. Before
explaining why things go this way, a little more needs to be said on the rest
of the logical vocabulary. The conditional is a tricky issue, and many differ-
ent treatments are certainly possible. One can have the standard material
conditional, say, “⊃”, by defining:
α ⊃ β =df ¬α ∨ β
As for a “vertebrate” conditional, say, →, at possible worlds we can have it
work as a standard strict conditional: if w ∈ P ,
• w |=+a α→ β iff for all worlds w1 (if w1 |=+a α then w1 |=+a β)
• w |=−a α→ β iff for some w1 (w1 |=+a α and w1 |=−a β)
As for impossible worlds, one natural option is to adopt the Routley-
Meyer semantics for relevant logics with the ternary accessibility relation R
on worlds. Truth conditions can be given as follows: if w ∈ I,
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(RM) w |=+a α→ β iff for all worlds w1, w2 such that Rww1w2 (if w1 |=+a α,
then w2 |=+a β).9
Falsity conditions are more complicated, but we can skip this issue; the
conditional can be treated more uniformly: we can have a RM-treatment
hold for P -worlds and I-worlds if we make the following further assumption,
usually called Normality Condition:
(NC) If w ∈ P , then Rww1w2 iff w1 = w2.
With the help of NC, the relevant conditional behaves as a strict one at all
possible worlds. A simpler option is to have it work as a strict conditional at
possible worlds, and to make conditional formulas α→ β behave anarchically
at impossible ones. Since impossible worlds are worlds where the laws of logic
are different, and conditionals are used to express laws of logic, conditionals
α → β may take on any sort of value at impossible worlds: their truth
values are not determined recursively, and the interpretation function v treats
conditionals as atomic, assigning extensions and anti-extensions directly, as
it happened to conjunctions and disjunctions at E-impossible worlds.10 As
for the modal operators, if w is a possible world:
• w |=+a 2α iff for all w1 ∈ P , w1 |=+a α
w |=−a 2α iff for some w1 ∈ P , w1 |=−a α
• w |=+a 3α iff for some w1 ∈ P , w1 |=+a α
w |=−a 3α iff for all w1 ∈ P , w1 |=−a α
The clauses for the modal operators have world quantifiers ranging only
over possible worlds: after all, (unrestricted) necessity is truth at all possi-
ble worlds, and (unrestricted) possibility is truth at some possible worlds.
9This clause is tailor-made to avoid validating the ‘fallacy of relevance’ α→ (β → β),
in which antecedent and consequent may share no propositional parameter. Non-normal
worlds were introduced in relevant logics exactly to do this job: a counterexample to the
fallacy is provided by an impossible world w such that for some (possible or impossible)
worlds w1 and w2, such that Rww1w2, β holds at w1 and fails at w2. How do we read
‘Rww1w2’, though? Here is a little bit of help from the literature: “In interpreting Rxyz
perhaps the best reading is to say that the combination of the pieces of information x and
y (not necessarily the union) is a piece of information in z (. . . ). On this reading Rxyz can
be regarded as saying that x and y are compatible according to z, or some such thing.”
Dunn [1986], p. 200. “An entailment (α → β) is true at some world if this world sees an
accessibility between two other worlds such that if (α) is true at the first of these worlds
(β) is true at the other.” Bremer [2005], p. 67
10This solution was first introduced, as far as I know, in Routley and Loparic [1978],
and is advertised in Priest [2001], 165-7.
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At impossible worlds of the I-kind and of the E-kind, v can assign truth
values directly and non-recursively to formulas of the form 2α and 3α,
treating them as atomic as well. As for the quantifiers, they also behave in
an orthodox fashion at worlds in P , and I, and anarchically at extensionally
impossible worlds E. At all w ∈ P ∪ I, then:
• w |=+a Λxα iff for all d ∈ D, w |=+a(x/d) α
w |=−a Λxα iff for some d ∈ D, w |=−a(x/d) α
• w |=+a Σxα iff for some d ∈ D, w |=+a(x/d) α
w |=−a Λxα iff for all d ∈ D, w |=−a(x/d) α
where “a(x/d)” denotes the assignment which is the same as a, except
that it assigns to x the value d. As we saw above, existential commitment
is supplied via a distinguished existence predicate, E!, to be used in the
definition of the existentially loaded quantifiers. Also the existence-entailing
features of some predicates can be accounted for by adding some formal
constraints. As advertised there, I will assume that, if an n-place predicate
P is existence-entailing in its ith place, it is such at all possible worlds:
• If w ∈ P , then if < d1, . . . , di, . . . , dn >∈ v + (P,w), then di ∈ v +
(E!, w).
Priest [2005], p. 60 does not take a stand on this; but it seems to me that
existence-entailments may be regarded as something similar to a kind of
meaning postulates, fixing the semantics of some predicates and, in particu-
lar, their internal connections to the predicate “exists”. Meaning postulates
can be taken as metaphysically necessary truths, holding at all metaphysi-
cally possible worlds (therefore, at all possible worlds simpliciter, if we make
the simplifying assumption that metaphysical necessity is coextensive with
logical necessity). So if Santa Claus thinks about Pegasus at w, then Santa
Claus exists at w though Pegasus need not; if Holmes kicks Moriarty at w,
then both exist at w; and this holds whenever w is a possible world. What
happens at impossible worlds, of course, is another story; nonexistent things,
for instance, may think or kick at some impossible world.
Finally, worlds are allowed to access E-impossible worlds when the truth
conditions for the conceivability operator, c©, are at issue. If w is a possible
world:
• w |=+a c©α iff for all w1 ∈ W such that wCw1, w1 |=+a α
• w |=−a c©α iff for some w1 ∈ W such that wCw1, w1 |=−a α
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These are the key clauses, and their intuitive explanation goes as follows.
The semantics of the conceivability operator is just a restatement of the
usual binary accessibility semantics for modal operators of ordinary modal
logics. The idea is that wCw1, that is, there is a conceivability accessibility
(C -accessibility) from w to w1, if and only if, at w1, things are as they are
conceived to be at w; or, equivalently: w1 is C -accessible from w, just in case
w1 realizes the way things are characterized, or described - that is, conceived
- to be at w. For instance, take the worst nightmares one may have (at
@); then a world w such that @Cw is a nasty world at which those worst
nightmares come true.
Now the reason why any impossible world, however logically anarchic, is
accessible when evaluating formulas of the form ‘ c©α’, is precisely that we
can form inconsistent conditions more or less of any kind: α(x) may be ‘x
is a round square’, ‘x is round and not round’, ‘x is red or blue but it is
not the case that x is red and it is not the case that x is blue’, etc. We
may conceive (imagine, think of, tell stories about, etc.) objects having any
(set of) properties, however extravagant. And our QCP tells us that for any
condition α(x), there will be worlds at which some object satisfies α(x) (this
is why we ultimately need such anarchic guys as impossible worlds).
Before I say something more on the sub-distinction between E-impossible
worlds and I-impossible worlds, we need a definition of logical validity and
logical consequence. It turns out that logical consequence is characterized
in a very conservative and straightforward way - in fact, the usual way for
modal logics with a distinguished base world: if S is a set of formulas,
S |= α iff for every interpretation < P, I, E,@, D,R,C, v >, and assignment
a, if @ |=+a β for all β ∈ S, then @ |=+a α
For logical validity, we have just that |= α is ∅ |= α. So logical consequence
is truth preservation at the base world, @, in all interpretations, and logical
validity is truth at @ in all interpretations. In fact, one may also define logical
consequence as truth preservation at all possible worlds in all interpretations:
the semantics sketched contains nothing to differentiate @ from any other
world w in this respect, insofar as w ∈ P , that is, w is possible (we are
into what follows logically from what, therefore, in what follows from what
at the worlds where logic is not different). As for the distinction between
I-impossible worlds and E-impossible worlds:11 it is motivated by the will to
11Priest calls ‘impossible worlds’ what I have baptized as I-impossible worlds, and calls
‘open worlds’ what I have baptized as E-impossible worlds, meaning that the latter are
not closed under logical entailment. However, given our definition of impossible world
above, Priest’s open worlds are obviously just impossible worlds of a certain (particularly
anarchic) kind.
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reconcile two opposite strands in the recent theorizing on impossible worlds -
two strands that reflect a certain ambiguity in the notion of impossible world
itself.
(a) On the one hand, if one takes “impossible worlds” to mean “worlds
where the laws of logic are different”, as advertised above, then it is rea-
sonable to assume that only the intensional conditional, and the box and
diamond, behave in a non-standard fashion at them:
The truth conditions for conjunction, disjunction and the quanti-
fiers remain the same at all worlds. Such operators have nothing
to do with expressing laws of logic. The modal operators are
clearly different, since their behaviour does concern the laws of
logic, and what is logically possible or necessary at an impossible
world may vary from what is actually so. (Priest [2005], p. 18)
If we followed this thread of thought, we would have to countenance
in our semantic structure only I-impossible worlds. Such semantics would
impose some structure to impossible worlds: conjunction, disjunction, and
the quantifiers behave wisely at them, and the Routley-Meyer semantics for
the conditional (admittedly, with the help of a few ad hoc clauses) refutes
just the paradoxes of the conditional, but saves many ordinary inferences
involving conditionals.
However some authors, e.g. Nolan [1997], favour an unrestricted compre-
hension principle for impossible worlds: for anything that cannot possibly be
the case, there is an impossible world at which that thing is the case: there
must be an impossible world for every way the world could not be. This
route, which takes impossible worlds as pretty anarchic, is followed also by
Vander Laan [1997] and Zalta [1997]: there are impossible worlds at which
conjunctions, disjunctions, etc., can behave as atomic formulas, so that α∧β
can be true even though α or β are not true, etc.
Furthermore, given our unrestricted (albeit Qualified) Comprehension
Principle for objects, we want to have worlds that realize the way things are
conceived to be for any conception, however weird. In particular, for any,
however minimal, logical restriction, one may conceive of objects that vio-
late that restriction (non-adjunctive impossible objects, nonprime impossible
objects, and so on). This is why in the semantic clauses for the evaluation
of formulas prefixed with our conceiving operator c©, worlds are allowed to
access impossible worlds of any kind.
How does the QCP square with all this? In na¨ıve Meinongianism any
condition characterized some object, but with no proviso on worlds at which
the object had the relevant properties. In particular, for any condition α(x),
calling o an object characterized by the condition, we could have (using our
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newly introduced notation) @ |=+ α(o), and therefore, @ |=+ Σxα(x). In
our modally qualified framework, if an object o is conceived as characterized
by α(x), then we have that @ |=+ c©α(o). Given the semantics of the con-
ceivability operator, this entails only that, for all worlds w that realize the
way things are conceived as being at @, that is, for all w such that @Cw,
w |=+ α(o) (and therefore, w |=+ Σxα(x)). As prescribed by the QCP,
objects do have the features they are conceived-at-@ as having, but not at
@: they have them only at the C -accessible worlds w (which may be pos-
sible or impossible ones) that realize such conception. Sherlock Holmes is
conceived-at-@, by Doyle and by the Sherlock Holmes fans and Doyle read-
ers, as being a detective and (let us assume) kicking Moriarty. He does not
have these properties at @, though - in particular, because being a detective
and kicking someone appear to be existence-entailing properties, whereas, at
@, Holmes does not exist. He has them, though, at the worlds that realize
the relevant conception.
We now have all the formal machinery we need, and we can move on to
the substantive issues.
4 Transworld Identity is Not a Problem
As hinted at above, the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on nonexistent objects
ascribes to modal noneism difficulties with handling ‘cross-world identity’.
But what is meant here with ‘cross-world identity’? Those familiar with the
problems of transworld identity and identification in modal logic and meta-
physics know that frequent misunderstandings have saddened the literature,
mainly because the relevant notions and the problems at stake have not been
spelled out carefully. So let us begin by giving a precise formulation.
The ‘problem of transworld identity’, correctly understood, is not an epis-
temic problem but a metaphysical one. It has to do with the conditions under
which an object relating to some world w1 in some way is the same as an
object relating to some distinct world w2 in the same way. The transworld
identity thesis can be formulated in neutral terms as follows:
(TI) Some individual, i, is such that, for some worlds w1 and w2, w1 6= w2
and i is at w1 and i is at w2.
Does modal noneism have troubles with this? The key issue is what ‘is at’
means in TI. If by ‘is at’ one means ‘is a part of’ in the sense of ‘part of’
captured by some standard mereological theory, TI gets rejected by a modal
realist of the Lewisian kind, because individuals according to Lewis are noto-
riously world-bound: no individual is (wholly) part of more than one Lewisian
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world. But also ersatz modal realists like Stalnaker or Plantinga may reject
TI in this interpretation, although for a different reason: ersatz worlds are
not maximal mereological sums of spatiotemporally related individuals. If,
on the other hand, one substitutes ‘individual’ with the more generic ‘world-
constituent’, some ersatzers can accept TI because, on some accounts, ersatz
worlds do have, as it were, ‘overlapping’ constituents. If worlds are abstract
set-theoretic constructions, then it is perfectly understandable that the same
individual can be a member of different worlds.
These answers to the TI-problem, anyway, depend on the stance one takes
on the metaphysical nature of worlds. The appropriate transworld identity
issue becomes evident when TI is phrased more neutrally in terms of ordinary
Kripke semantics for quantified modal logic. In this phrasing, the fact that
modal noneism faces no ‘difficult questions about cross-world identity’ also
becomes evident. Let us see why.
Transworld identity can be felt as a problem from the viewpoint of or-
dinary modal semantics because Kripke frames notoriously involve vary-
ing domains (see Kripke [1963]). In a simple case, we have a structure
< W,R, f, v >, where W is the set of all (possible) worlds; R is the usual
binary accessibility relation (not to be confused with the ternary ‘relevant’ ac-
cessibility relation employed above within the presentation of modal noneist
semantics); v is the interpretation function. The element we are more in-
terested in is f ; this is the domain function, mapping members of W to
non-empty sets. Now the transworld identity claim can be reshaped as:
(TI) Some individual, i, is such that, for some worlds w1 and w2, w1 6= w2
and i ∈ f(w1) and i ∈ f(w2).
The intuitive reading is that, when w ∈ W , f(w) is the domain of w, com-
prising the things that exist at w; and quantified formulas, when evaluated
at w, have quantifiers ranging only over f(w). However, sometimes also con-
stant domain modal frames are phrased with a domain function - one just
assumes that f has constant values: for any two worlds w1 and w2 in the
model, f(w1) = f(w2) (see e.g. Fitting and Mendelsohn [1998], p. 102).
Now, from a Meinongian viewpoint the problem of this reading, of course,
is that it conflates quantification and existence. Ordinary variable domain
semantics try to capture the idea of contingent existence - the idea that
things ‘exist at’ some, but not all worlds - by having objects included in
the domain of some worlds and not of others. But modal noneism captures
the intuition in a more straightforward way, by having things instantiate the
(perfectly ordinary) property of existence at some, but not all worlds. Given
the characterization of existence provided above, to exist at some world w
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just is to have causal properties at w and, perhaps, to be spatiotemporally
available there.12
But even if we unburden the interpretation of ‘is at’ from any existential
commitment in the TI-claim, the very idea of objects ‘populating a world’
as objects (whether or not they exist at that world) cannot match with the
modal noneist semantics presented above. The reason is plain: it is not the
case that objects ‘are at’ worlds. Objects are simply objects, that is, property
bearers. What is ‘at some world’, ‘not at some (other) world’, is the having
of properties by objects. The worlds apparatus aims at representing, as it
were, the de re variation of properties had by objects. One had better avoid
talk of objects ‘being at’, or ‘being in’ worlds altogether, and mirror this fact
by having the domain of all objects directly represented in the set-theoretic
frame, with no domain function at all. Even constant domain frames, when
presented in terms of a function having worlds as arguments, could be taken
as somewhat misleading: in interpreting the mathematical structure, one is
encouraged to read ‘is at’ as something like ‘is located within’ - to think of
worlds as things that have insides, like boxes or big containers. But - as
van Inwagen has forcefully argued (in Van Inwagen [1986]) - worlds are not
boxes, nor containers.
That the semantics above validates the Barcan schema,
(BS) 3Σxα(x) |= Σx3α(x)
squares with these considerations. From the fact that it is possible that b
(who is actually sisterless) has a sister, it follows that something is such that
it is possibly b’s sister; and from the fact that it is possible that some fat man
is in Quine’s doorway, it follows that something is such that it is possibly a
fat man in Quine’s doorway. It is not the case that such things as things ‘are
at’ the actual world, or ‘are at’ some other world(s). These are just things in
the domain of the totality of objects; at some other world(s), they have the
property of being b’s sister, or fat men in Quine’s doorway. And they need
not exist at the actual world @ - they can well be nonexistent objects.
Modal noneism, therefore, respects the intuition that nothing is, in fact,
sisterless b’s sister at the actual world. But we can think about sisterless b’s
sister - call such an object ‘s ’ - and we have, when F = ‘is b’s sister’, that
@ |=+ c©Fs. What follows from this is only that the object so conceived is
b’s sister at the relevant worlds, that is, at the worlds w such that @Cw :
12It is a controversial issue whether variable domain Kripke semantics ultimately avoid
commitment to mere possibilia and, therefore, to objects that do not exist (at @). I think
this is not the case: there are Kripke models at which some objects in the domain of other
worlds are not in the domain of the actual one. And the semantic metalanguage quantifies
over them, even though they are out of reach for the object language quantifiers.
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w |=+ Fs (therefore, w |=+ ΣxFx). In particular, when w is a possible world,
we may also grant that s exists at w, if we think that being someone’s sister
is an existence-entailing property.
Does the fact that the transworld identity problem does not arise for
modal noneism entail that the theory can avoid any form of haecceitistic de
re representation of individuals by worlds? It seems not, and this can be
made clear by considering the following objection to modal noneism, raised
by Parsons [2006].
We have maintained that, according to the QCP, objects have the prop-
erties they are conceived as having at the worlds that realize the conception
at issue. Now, let us consider Doyle’s stories, and a world, w1, at which the
stories are true. At w1, something has all the properties Holmes is charac-
terized as having by the stories. This is Holmes. However, we can think of a
situation in which you have all the properties ascribed to Holmes by Doyle’s
novels. Call w2 the world at issue now (which may be a metaphysically
possible one or not, give and take some intuitions one has about essential
properties - an irrelevant point here). It seems that, at w2, you are Holmes,
and this, Parsons concludes, will not do.
The first thing to say about this problem is that it is not specific to
Meinongianism, that is, to a theory that subscribes to the idea that some
things do not exist. In fact, this is just a variant on the classic Chisholm
[1967] Adam-Noah puzzle, which concerns actualists as much as Meinongians.
The difficulty comes from the assumption that objects can be identified, as
modal metaphysicians say, via a ‘purely qualitative’ account: we start with
worlds, and if at some world something satisfies the Holmes characterization,
it seems that that thing should be Holmes.
The solution for modal noneism consists in denying such assumption.
The consequence of such a denial is a certain form of haecceitism: if α(x)
is Holmes’ characterization as provided by Doyle’s stories, then a world w1
can represent an individual, i1, as characterized by α(x), whereas a world w2
can represent a distinct individual, i2, as characterized by α(x). There are
worlds at which you satisfy the Holmes characterization. But Holmes is a
nonexistent object (at @), whereas (perhaps luckily) you are not; so by the
contraposed Leibniz’s Law, you are not Holmes. There are also worlds at
which Holmes, despite existing, does not satisfy the Holmes characterization
- say, a world at which he is not a brilliant detective living in Baker Street,
but a gardener in Birmingham. In Priest’s words: “The identity of an object
is not determined by its properties at any one world” (Priest [2005], p. 90).
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5 Transworld Identification Is (Relatively) Not
a Problem
Unsurprisingly, the haecceitistic account to be endorsed by the noneist is
broadly Kripkean; and this brings us directly to the issue of identification.
The problem of transworld identification is due to Kaplan. It is, in fact,
an epistemic one: how can we know whether we have a case of transworld
identity? How are we to tell which object at another world is the same as an
object at this world?
Scholars tend to consider transworld identity as a real issue (unless one
is a counterpart theorist), and transworld identification as a pseudo-problem
- which is probably due to the influence of Kripke [1980]. Other worlds are
not something we glance at via the famous telescope. They are not the
subject of empirical investigation: our access to other worlds is conceptual.
We don’t need to represent alternative situations in purely qualitative terms.
“Generally, things aren’t ‘found out’ about a counterfactual situation, they
are stipulated” (Kripke [1980], p. 49) et cetera: the story is so well known
that it hardly needs rehearsing (see also Plantinga [1974], p. 95; Chihara
[1998]).
To some extent, the ‘stipulation’ solution works also for noneists. The
deflationist answer to the question of how we identify Holmes at a given
world may (perhaps with dismay) be that at any given world w, x = Holmes
if x has the property of being precisely Holmes. The thought is that we
can reason counterfactually on nonexistents as well as on existents, and
if someone claims: ‘Suppose that Holmes was killed in The Hound of the
Baskervilles . . . ’, the question ‘How do you know that it would be Holmes?’
is spurious. Our task is not to find out which object in the other world is
Holmes - this would be like “putting the cart before the horse.” (Fitting and
Mendelsohn [1998], p. 147).
However, it turns out that the Kripkean stipulation account does not solve
all the questions raised for noneism by transworld considerations. In partic-
ular: stipulation cannot give infallible epistemic access to other worlds.13 To
understand the issue, we have to enter the unstable realm of modal episte-
mology.
Call a priori knowledge whatever knowledge does not require some causal
connection with the object known (there certainly are much more sophisti-
cated characterizations around, but this one will be sufficient for our pur-
poses). Meinongian nonexistent objects can be known, if at all, a priori. We
assume here that a priori knowledge is in general possible and real - e.g.,
13This formulation of the point is due to Divers [2002], p. 273.
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knowledge of sets and numbers. But one may claim that, even granting this,
we have the following, specific problem about our allegedly a priori knowl-
edge of Meinongian, nonexistent objects. Unlike sets and numbers, in modal
noneism Pegasus and Holmes are supposed to be concrete, particular, non-
abstract objects, that is, precisely the kind of things that, unlike sets and
numbers, should be knowable only a posteriori.14
The noneist may reply by borrowing from Lewis [1986], p. 111 the follow-
ing claim: the epistemic status (a priori/a posteriori) of our knowledge of ob-
ject x does not supervene on the metaphysical status of x (abstract/concrete,
existent/nonexistent), but on the modal status of the facts concerning x (I
will not discuss here whether Lewis’ stance is vulnerable to objections from
the availability of a priori contingent truths). The Qualified Comprehen-
sion Principle at the heart of modal noneism is supposed to explain why we
know various things about nonexistent objects we have no causal acquain-
tance with - a knowledge which is, in this broad sense, a priori. As explained
above, the core idea of a comprehension principle for objects is that objects
have the properties they are characterized as having. This accounts for the
manifest fact that, when we talk about flying horses, unicorns, Santa Claus,
and Holmes, we usually know what we are talking about.15 Given a condi-
tion α(x), say, ‘x is a winged horse’ we can talk of xα(x), ‘a winged horse’,
and be guaranteed that α(xα(x)), that is, a winged horse is a horse with
wings. But the noneist QCP for objects is a general metaphysical principle
that accounts specifically for our modal knowledge of possible and impossible
worlds. We can have abundant knowledge of modal facts by exploring the
realm of possibilities (and impossibilities) completely a priori. What possi-
bilities and impossibilities there are (that is, how the totality of worlds is)
is not a variable subject matter. So we need no causal acquaintance with
winged horses to know how one of them may look like: we know how a horse
looks like, and we know how a pair of wings looks like, so we easily have the
representation of a winged horse.16 What we cannot know a priori is what
possibilities we @-inhabitants are: it takes causal acquaintance to establish
whether something is a winged horse at @, that is, at this world.
14See Priest [2005], 136-7, on the concreteness of such Meinongian nonexistents as
Holmes and Pegasus. Notice that this ‘objection from concreteness’ corresponds to the
one raised by Skyrms (Skyrms [1976]) against Lewis’ modal realism: after all, even though
they exist, Lewisian possibilia share with nonexistent objects the feature that there is no
causal or spatiotemporal relation with them.
15In Fitting and Mendelsohn’s words: “Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, Santa Claus. These
do not appear to be utterly unreal. It is not as if one is faced with emptiness, a void:
there is something on which to focus our attention and about which we can converse
intelligently.” (Fitting and Mendelsohn [1998], p. 176)
16See Lewis’ Principle of Recombination, in Lewis [1986], p. 87-8.
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Let us now generalize these considerations. For any meaningful condition
α(x), in the modal noneist theory some object - call it o - can be conceived as
satisfying it; so we have @ |=+ c©α(o). One can take α(x) as the inconsistent
condition ‘x is a round square’: the noneist semantics above guarantees that,
at some world w, o is a round square: w |=+ α(o). What is not in our powers
to ‘stipulate’ is that w be a possible world and, a fortiori, that w = @. In
general, we cannot stipulate at which worlds objects have the properties they
are characterized as having - whether these are possible worlds, and whether
they include the actual one. What one can fantasize about and what is the
case in the real world, unfortunately, are at times severely different things.
So we can extend to (the haecceitistic) modal noneism John Divers’ claim
that Kripkean ‘stipulation’ is not the panacea of modal metaphysics:
When I use the word ‘Socrates’ inside an explicitly worldly con-
text, ‘at w’, or inside an implicitly worldly (modal or counterfac-
tual) context (. . . ) I do not thereby make it the case, nor do I
come to know, that such a world is a possible world. It is this
crucial point that underlies the complaint against (the claim that
stipulation can give epistemic access to other worlds). It is one
question how we know which objects are the objects of our de
re modal thought and talk, and perhaps there stipulation has a
legitimate role. It is another question altogether how we know
what is modally true of those objects, and there stipulation has
no legitimate role to play. (Divers [2002], p. 273)
6 A Real Problem: Extensionally Indiscern-
ible Nonexistents
Besides the problem of having a principle producing a plenitude of nonex-
istent objects, Meinongian object theories notoriously face the problem of
accounting for the identity of the (admitted) nonexistents. What is at issue,
this time, has to do neither with epistemic subjects (how we can know and
identify nonexistent objects), nor with problems of transworld identity; it is
the question of what actually explains the identity of the object and accounts
for it, which usually goes under the label of the ‘criterion of identity’ in the
literature.
That Meinongian object theories may encounter difficulties in accounting
for the identity of nonexistents is well known (besides the aforementioned
notorious Quine [1948] - see also Lambert [1974]). Unsurprisingly, different
kinds of Meinongianism embody in their principles of identity for objects
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the same basic notions they introduce for the respective characterization
principles. Parsons’ nuclear Meinongianism, for instance, has it that:
(NI) x = y iff x and y have the same nuclear properties. (Parsons [1980],
pp. 19 and 74)
Zalta’s encoding Meinongianism has its principle of identity phrased as fol-
lows:
(EI) x = y iff x and y encode the same properties. (Zalta [1983], pp. 13
and 33)
What about modal noneism? The key feature of the noneist QCP, as we
have seen, is its resorting to different worlds. Predictably, Priest formulates
the corresponding principle of identity with respect to this notion, thereby
embodying modality into it. An object is the object it is because it has the
properties it has at the worlds where it has them:
(MI) x = y iff x and y have the same properties at all worlds.17
A first qualm with MI comes from the thought that it involves a form of the
Identity of Indiscernibles18 - a very controversial principle, as is well known.19
But even if the modal noneist provides an account of identity for nonexistents
that takes identity as a primitive notion, more serious troubles lie in wait.
Bluntly put, these depend on the fact that no such account, by definition,
can involve any existence-entailing property. Given the idea of existence
as (disposition to) causal interactivity, and/or spatiotemporal availability,
favoured by noneists, no account of identity for nonexistents can involve such
notions. But many philosophers accept only accounts of identity that involve
causal and/or spatiotemporal features - at least for concrete objects:20 being
in the same place at the same time, for instance. Therefore, no account of
the identity of nonexistent objects is acceptable for these philosophers.
17Priest [2005], 88 and 114-5. Actually, Priest restricts the principle so as to exclude
what he calls open worlds, and which correspond to our extensionally impossible worlds
above. Furthermore, also properties including identity should be ruled out from the crite-
rion, which otherwise gets trivialized (Ibid). These provisos, though, have no import for
the current discussion.
18“The identity of an object supervenes on the properties it has”, says Priest [2005], p.
88. Later on, he claims that “to share some properties (. . . ) is not sufficient for sharing
all properties, and so being identical” (114).
19See Black [1952] for forceful and famous criticisms; see also Wiggins [2001], Ch. 1,
Ladyman [2005].
20Abstract objects are a different story, of course: a Quinean extensionalist can accept
sets on the ground that they have purely extensional identity conditions: x and y are the
same set if they have the same members.
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The point can be made precise as follows. Call x and y extensionally
indiscernible objects just in case they are distinct, but indiscernible with re-
spect to all their non-modal properties, that is, properties not involving any
reference to worlds other than @. Modal noneism is committed to extension-
ally indiscernible nonexistent objects: concrete, nonexistent things that are
indiscernible if one looks at their ‘extensional features’, but are claimed to
be distinct because they should be discernible at other worlds. Two nonex-
istent objects, a and b, may have the same non-modal properties (say: at
@, both are fictional characters, both are nonexistents, both are less famous
than Immanuel Kant, etc.). This means that, to falsify ‘a = b’, one wants to
claim that they differ in intensional and intentional features: one is thought
about by someone but not the other; one is a detective at some other world
w but not the other; etc. To distinguish nonexistents, one sometimes can
only (conceptually) look at other-worldly goings-on.21
But how can ‘two’ extensionally indiscernible nonexistent objects be claim-
ed to be two, on the basis of alleged differences at other worlds? This is es-
pecially objectionable if one subscribes to the so-called Modal Supervenience
(MS) thesis, to be found in various forms, for instance, in Jubien [1993],
Levey [1997], Sider [1999], and Olson [2001]. In a slogan: ‘No modal differ-
ences without actual differences’. To ground differences at the actual world
on purely modal intuitions is ‘to put the cart before the horse’, for modal
differences in their turn have to be grounded on actual differences.
The examples targeted in the literature are such allegedly coincident but
distinct things as a statue, s, and the lump of clay, c, the statue is made of.
Some ontologists claim that s and c are distinct, for s could survive small
parts replacement, whereas c couldn’t; s didn’t exist before the sculptor made
it, whereas c did; and so on (see Johnston [1992], Baker [1997], Thomson
[1998], Fine [2000]). But, supporters of MS ask, how can s and c differ in their
modal properties when they coincide in their actual properties? After all,
they have the same shape, size, weight, colour, spatiotemporal location, etc.
Where could modal differences come out from?22 Generalizing: how could
one resort to alleged modal and temporal differences, that is, properties whose
21See Priest [2005], 89 and 112-3 for examples of such intensional applications of the
identity criterion.
22Here is Lewis in On the Plurality of Worlds:“we have one thing. What we have two
of, besides names for it, are ways of representing. There is some kind of equivocation
built into representation de re, and the equivocation shows up when we get conflicting
answers. (. . . ) It reeks of double counting to say that here we have a dishpan, and we also
have a dishpan-shaped bit of plastic that is just where the dishpan is, weighs just what
the dishpan weighs (why don’t the two together weigh twice as much?), and so on. This
multiplication of entities is absurd on its face” (Lewis [1986], p. 252).
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specification involves reference to other worlds or times, to settle the issue
whether s and c are the same at @? How could one decide on identities and
differences by (conceptually) peeking at other worlds, before identifying and
differentiating things at this world? We cannot look at the modal features of
things in order to establish identities and differences, before we have identified
and distinguished such things: we cannot glimpse at their modal properties
before we have ascertained whether they are the same or not. Questions
concerning the modal features of objects presuppose that they have already
been individuated, and such individuation has to be non-modal to begin
with.
To be sure, also in this case the concern doesn’t specifically affect nonex-
istents as such: it is orthogonal to the problem of Meinongian objects (we
talk of an existing statue and an existing lump of clay, of course). However,
if one subscribes to MS, this may rule out not only some existent objects, but
(concrete) nonexistents as well; for the argument runs for the nonexistents
a and b mentioned above, as it ran for the existents s and c: how could we
discern the extensionally indiscernible a and b by resorting to differences at
other worlds, before we have settled the problem of their identity at @?
A line of reply for the modal noneist may consist in simply adopting
a deflationary attitude towards criteria of identity in general - again, just
as many realists concerning (allegedly) existent but ‘intensional’ entities do
(properties, propositions, universals, etc.). She may ask for independent
arguments for countenancing only entities with universally acceptable criteria
of identity; or even question the transparency of the very notion.23 She may
try a tu quoque, by claiming (following Kripke [1978]) that we sometimes
lack criteria of identity also for ordinary (and, to be sure, existing) objects;
and (following French and Krause [1995]) even for the elementary particles
of quantum physics. But whatever stance is taken by the modal noneist on
these specific issues, we believe the discussion developed so far allows us to
draw a more general moral.
23This route is taken by Parsons: “ ‘Principle of individuation’ is technical jargon that
needs to be explained. The trouble is, there simply is no explanation of what it means
that would let a neutral observatory apply it to ‘new’ categories of (proposed) things. We
have been given some examples (. . . ) but no procedure has even been hinted at that would
allow the examples to be generalized to new cases.” (Parsons [1979a], p. 661)
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7 Conclusion: Modal Noneism Is on the Mar-
ket
The most important lesson to learn from the issues addressed in this paper,
I believe, is that (suspected or real) troubles for noneism aren’t for the most
part troubles that affect specifically its Meinongian ontology as such: they
are orthogonal to the issue of nonexistence. Problems concerning criteria of
identity, transworld identity and identification are to be dealt with by any
theory involved with modalities, worlds semantics, and modal ontology, even
when their proponents are hard-core actualists subscribing to the Quinean
motto that to be is to be the value of a (bound) variable.
Besides, when addressing such problems, as we have seen, modal noneism
performs fairly well overall. The theory can be tested with respect to how
it organizes the linguistic, semantic and ontological phenomena it addresses,
and how it provides a problem solving strategy for the recalcitrant data.
When difficulties arise, different options are available to the modal noneist
- some more palatable, some less. Sometimes a price has to be paid some-
where, whatever option is taken - as it happens, I believe, to any interesting
philosophical view. This provides, albeit in a roundabout way, evidence for
the idea that a priori dismissals of Meinongianism as a preposterous ontol-
ogy are unmotivated. Gilbert Ryle once claimed that “Gegenstandstheorie
(. . . ) is dead, buried and not going to be resurrected.” (Ryle [1973], p.
255). As often happens with people prematurely declaring the death of sub-
stantial philosophical positions, he was wrong and doomed to be refuted by
subsequent developments.
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